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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In the most recent case, C. v. Schroeder,9 the court
apparently holds that "irresistable impulse" even if shown
to be habitual is not a defense. The court said: "This re-
cital of facts we have deemed necessary because of the
main defense interposed in the appellant's behalf, which
was that she was the victim of an uncontrollable impulse
to rob, steal and flee. * * * * Every habitual criminal might
excuse his wrongdoing on the ground that his impulses
moved him to break the law. It may be that unrestrained
impulses operate in many crimes, but society for its own
protection cannot recognize such a state of mind as excus-
ing the wrongdoer. The court should have told the jury
that the defense of irresistable impulse is one which our law
does not recognize." The court cited C. v. Mosler, supra.
A decision that denies an exemptive effect to mental
diseases which affect the conative emotional life of an actor,
or his power of inhibiting acts that he apparently knows to
be wrong and illegal, is sure to be provocative of criticism.
In view of the recent progress of medical and psychological
learning it is to be regretted that the court was content to
base its decision upon a Gibsonian hypothesis propounded
in 1846.
W. H. Hitchler.
RECENT CHANGES IN THE INHERITANCE
TAX LAWS
The Act of May 16, 1929, P. L. 1795 amending the In-
heritance Tax Act of June 20, 1919, P. L. 521 and its
supplements has made several distinct changes in the
classes of property on the transfer of which a tax is to
be levied.
Under the Act of 1919 a tax was to be levied under
Section 1 (d), "when any person or corporation comes into
the possession or enjoyment * * * * of any property trans-
ferred pursuant to a power of appointment contained in any
instrument taking effect after the passage of this act".
9302 Pa. 1, 152 Atd. 835 (Nov. 24, 1930).
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It had early been recognized in Pennsylvania that when
the power of appointment was exercised the property
passed from the donor to the appointee and not from the
donee to the appointee.' Hence when the tax was assessed
the property was regarded as passing from the donor and
whether it was to be the collateral tax or the direct tax
was to be determined by relationship to the donor and not
to the donee.2
In recent years the Supreme Court formulated a new
doctrine in reference to transfers under powers. McCord's
Estate8 said, "The donee may transfer property to her own
estate and make it a part thereof for all purposes. It thus
becomes blended with her other property as one estate,
from which debts and legacies were payable. The donee
could have transferred the property as a gift from the
donor but did not do so. Here the property passes as the
estate of the donee and is subject to the inheritance tax as
the donee's transfer."
This doctrine of "blending" the property over which
the decedent had a power and his own in such a fashion
as to have the transfer or passing regarded as his act and
not that of the donor has been consistently followed.4
The Act of 1929 makes this addition to the Act of
1919, "Provided, That property transferred pursuant to
powers of appointment shall, in all cases where the power
is hereafter exercised, be taxed as of the estate of the
donor, notwithstanding any blending of such property
with the property of the donee."
The necessary effect of this proviso is to abolish the
exception created by the Pennsylvania courts to the general
rule that property passing under an exercise of a power of
appointment is a passing from the donor.
1Comm. v. Williams' Exs., 13 Pa. 29 (1850).
2Huddy's Estate, 236 Pa. 276 (1912).
8276 Pa. 459 (1923).
'Forney's Estate, 280 Pa. 282 (1924); Twitchell's Estate, 284 Pa.
135 (1925); Hagen's Estate, 285 Pa. 326 (1926); Valentine's Estate,
297 Pa. 99 (1929); 64 A. L. FL 748 (1929).
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Leach's Estate5 raised the question as to whether there
was a sufficient transfer of property on the death of one
of two joint tenants, with the right of survivorship present
by agreement, for the assessment of an inheritance tax.
It was there held that the interest of the survivor accrued
at the time of purchase and that the one-half did not pass
to him by succession from the decedent but by reason of
the contract. It was properly held that no tax was due.
That the same conclusion would inevitably follow in the
case of tenants by the entirety was conceded in the Leach
case.
The Act of 1929 adds subdivision (e) to Section 1 mak-
ing a tax due, "whenever any property, real or personal, is
held in the joint names of two or more persons, except as
tenants by the entirety,6 or is deposited in banks or other
institutions or depositories in the joint names of two or
more persons, except as husband and wife,7 and payable to
either or the survivor upon the death of one of such per-
sons, the right of the surviving person or persons entitled
to the immediate ownership or possession and enjoyment of
such property shall be deemed, prima facie, a transfer of
one-half, or other proper fraction thereof, taxable under
the provisions of this act, in the same manner as though
this part of the property to which such transfer relates
belonged to joint tenants or joint depositors as tenants in
common and had been bequeathed or devised to the surviv-
ing persons by such deceased joint tenant or joint depositor
by will."
This provision is manifestly an endeavor to negative
the decision in the Leach case and to make a tax due on
the accrual of the right of possession or ownership by sur-
vivorship in joint tenancies.
The act raises several interesting questions. Is the
act constitutional? The possible objection that the subject
matter of taxing the right of possession or ownership ac-
cruing by survivorship is not covered by the title of the
5282 Pa. 545 (1925). See also McIntosh's Estate, 289 Pa. 509 (1927).
6Italics added.
TItalics added.
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act8 is met by the addition to the title of these words, "and
taxing joint estates." It would seem that a question might
well be raised whether the act does not embrace more than
one subject.9 The subject of the Act of 1919 is the taxing
of transfers of property on death or in contemplation of
death. But the Supreme Court has held that there is no
transfer in the case of survivorship.10 Is not the "taxing
of joint estates" the taxing of something other than trans-
fers of property? The act exempts tenancies by the en-
tirety and joint deposits by husband and wife. Is this ex-
emption constitutional? The Constitution requires that all
taxes be uniform, upon the same class of subjects and
decrees that all laws exempting property from taxation
8Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873, Article 2, Section 3.
9Idem.
10Leach's Estate, 276 Pa. 459 (1923). On this point the recent
case of Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497, 74 L. Ed. 991 is highly interest-
ing and may presage the answer on this point by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. The federal inheritance tax was imposed specifical-
ly on the interest held by a decedent as tenant by the entirety except
such part as was shown to have originally belonged to the Survivor
and never to have belonged to the decedent. The contentions of the
taxpayers were that such a tax levied on a supposed transfer from
the decedent to the surviving tenant by the entirety was in reality a
direct and unapportioned tax on the property itself since there was
no transfer and hence that the tax was unconstitutional under
Article 1, Section 2, clause 3 and Section 9, clause 4 of the U. S.
Constitution; and that the tax was so arbitrary as to amount to the
taking of property without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment. The Court held, however, that in the case of the death
of one of the tenants by the entirety, the death was a "generating
source" of rights in the survivor; that actually as the result of the
death new rights not theretofore possessed came into existence; that
as a result of the death the survivor was entitled to exclusive pos-
session, use and enjoyment of the property; that then and then only
the survivor acquired the power to hold and enjoy the property ab-
solutely as his or her own; that the death of one of the parties be-
came the "generating source" of important and definite accession to
the property rights of the other; and that whether technically a trans-
fer or not, such accession was taxable and was plainly an indirect tax
needing no apportionment and as plainly not arbitrary or unreason-
able. If such be true with tenants by the entirety it is equally true
in the case of joint tenants and such the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court is likely to decide.
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other than the enumerated ones shall be void.1 If Copes
Estate2 is still the law the exemption would seem to be
invalid as this exemption is no different than the exemption
of small estates. If the Cope case is not now controlling
and it has been questioned 3 the exemption must still meet
the objection of unreasonable classification. There seems
to be no reason for exempting a transfer from husband to
wife or vica versa in these cases and not in the other cases
where a direct tax is assessed. In any event, the mere
fact of the relationship of husband and wife would not
justify a tax exemption." It might be contended that there
is no transfer under the survivorship doctrine in husband
and wife cases while there is such a transfer in joint ten-
ancy case.' 5 But the Leach case had denied any distinction
in the two cases. We conclude that the constitutionality
of the provision and of the exemption may well be doubted.
It is to be noted that the act distinguishes the cases of
joint deposits in banks or other depositories. Is this an
expression of the legislature that joint bank deposits are
not joint tenancies of personal property? It is a reasonable
conclusion that the legislature thought that such were not
"the holding of any property, real or personal, in the names
of two or more persons".
As to property held in the joint names of two or more
persons, the act excepts property held as tenants by the
entirety. As to property deposited in banks or other in-
stitutions in the joint names of two or more persons, the
act excepts property deposited as husband and wife. Was
""Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873, Article 9, Sections 1 and 2.
12191 Pa. 1 (1899).
"3 Knowles' Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 589 (1929).
"4t must not be forgotten that the Supreme Court has held that
distinctions based on the nearness in relationship to the decedent of
the one taking the property are justifiable distinctions for inherit-
ance tax exemptions, Commonwealth v. Randall, 225 Pa. 197. But the
query still remains, why the exemption on relationship in tenancies by
the entireties and none where the property was separately owned by
the deceased spouse-the relationship being the same in both cases.
21Cf. U. S. v. Robertson, 183 Fed. 711 (1910), writ of certiorari
denied in 220 U. S. 616 (1911).
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the change in language intentional or merely accidental?
That the latter is not to be presumed is axiomatic in
statutory construction. If the change was intentional, did
the legislature intend the latter exception-as husband and
wife-to be more inclusive than the former-as tenants by
the entirety? That the legislature could have intended the
contrary implication-that the latter exemption was to
be less inclusive-seems impossible. The fact that the
language was changed in the latter exception leads to an
inference that the legislature believed that husband and
wife might own joint deposits other than as tenants by the
entirety and wished to include such other holdings in the
exemption from taxation. It has been held that husband
and wife may hold real property concurrently as tenants in
common." Certainly such property is not within the ex-
ception of the act. It has been contended that the usual
form of bank deposit in the names of husband and wife in
which either has the right of checking does not create a
tenancy by the entirety but creates an ordinary joint ten-
ancy.' 7 If this be true, the deposit is excepted from the act
as effectively as if it were a tenancy by the entirety since
it is still a deposit in the names of husband and wife. But
why should a joint bank deposit with survivorship between
husband and wife be excepted and not a joint tenancy with
survivorship of real or other personal property? There
seems to be no justification for such distinction and yet the
wording of the act would result in such a distinction.
The act states, "the right of the surviving person or
persons * * * * shall be deemed, prima facie, a transfer of one-
half," etc. The act might have said more properly that
the right shall be deemed to be the result of a transfer and this
transfer shall be taxable, etc.
The transfer is to be regarded as of one-half, one-
third, etc. as the number of survivors shall be one or two,
etc. But that it is such a transfer is merely a rebuttable
presumption, the act saying "prima facie." By what facts
may this presumption be rebutted and the transfer be
16Blease v. Anderson, 241 Pa. 198 (1913).
1734 Dickinson Law Review 156 et seq. (March, 1930).
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shown to have been of more or less than one-half? The
act is silent on the subject. The only facts that would
seem to be relevant to rebut the presumption would be the
facts as to the actual, original ownership of the property."'
If the survivor shows that the property was originally his
and that the joint ownership form resulted from his gift,
the conclusion would be that no tax is due as there is no
transfer. But is there not actually as much a transfer by
death in such a case as where the property was paid for
equally by both? Is the presumption rebuttable by the
Commonwealth? May it show that the survivor originally
owned none of the property and that, therefore, the trans-
fer is of all of the property? There is no reason to dis-
tinguish the two situations. It is inevitable that the ques-
tion will give rise to much dispute in the collection of taxes.
It is to be regretted that the act did not make the pre-
sumption irrebuttable.
Harold S. Irwin
DISTRIBUTION OF EXTRAORDINARY DIVIDENDS
IN CORPORATE STOCK TRUSTS
Where a trust consists of corporate stocks an interest-
ing question is presented as to whether the life tenant or
the remainderman or both are to benefit by the extra-
ordinary dividends. The majority rule' commonly called
18 The expression used in the federal act is a nicer one. The
act imposes the tax on the whole of the property held by. the deceased
joint tenant or tenant by the entirety but creates an exception, with
the burden on the taxpayer to show such exception, "such part there-
of as may be shown to have originally belonged to such other person
and never to have been received or acquired by the latter from the
decedent for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth . . ." See 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1094 (e).
'Discussion of Pennsylvania rule up to 1928, see 33 Dickinson
Law Review 31; review of Pennsylvania decisions (1927) Nirdlingers
Estate 290 Pa. 457. General discussion of all rules-notes (1921) 13
A. L. R. 1004; (1923) 24 A. L. R. 9; (1926) 42 A. L. R. 448; (1927) 50
A. L. R. 375; (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1287, 1315; (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1532.
